In this paper, we investigate the relationship between real exchange rate dynamics and financial market imperfections. For this purpose, we first construct a New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) model that incorporates staggered loan contracts as a simple form of the financial market imperfections. Our model with such a financial market friction replicates persistent, volatile, and realistic hump-shaped responses of real exchange rates, which have been thought very difficult to materialize in standard NOEM models. Remarkably, these realistic responses can materialize even with both supply and demand shocks, such as cost-push, loan rate, and monetary policy shocks. This implies that the financial market developments is a key element for understanding real exchange rate dynamics.
Introduction
Empirical studies conclude that real exchange rate dynamics are very volatile, persistent, and hump-shaped against shocks as shown in Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) , Cheung and Lai (2000) , Faust and Rogers (2003), and Steinsson (2007) . Thus far in international …-nance, there has been intense debate as to whether theoretical dynamic general equilibrium models can reproduce such realistic exchange rate dynamics. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) , focusing on the …rst two features, insist that New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) models may account for the volatility but not for the persistence to a monetary policy shock. In response to this critique, several studies have attempted to solve these three puzzles by introducing such features as strategic complementarity, nonoptimizing monetary policy, and optimal monetary policy into otherwise standard NOEM models as in Bergin and Feenstra (2000) and Benigno (2004a, b) . These newly introduced mechanisms mitigate the persistence puzzle of the real exchange rate dynamics to some extent, but have not yet solved it completely. Actual persistence of real exchange rates is still higher than that simulated in those models. Furthermore, the mechanisms do not explain the signi…cant hump-shaped responses of real exchange rates found in data. Steinsson (2007) stresses the importance of generating hump-shaped responses based on his autoregressive estimation of real exchange rates and shows that realistic levels of volatility, persistence, and humpshaped responses of real exchange rates can be generated with the NOEM models when the cost-push shock is added to the economy, where the home bias is very strong. 1 Analyses of the role of …nancial market imperfection for the real exchange rate dynamics, however, are very limited, even though Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2007) emphasize the role of a …nancial market imperfection to explain the business cycle tendencies found in data. In this paper, therefore we shed light on a sticky loan rate adjustment as a …nancial market imperfection for the real exchange rate dynamics. The loan rate stickiness is reported in Slovin and Sushka (1983) and Berger and Udell (1992) for the United States (US), Sorensen and Werner (2006) and Gambacorta (2008) for the euro area, and Bank of Japan (2007, 2009) for Japan.
We construct a NOEM model with an explicit role of banks in which we incorporate sticky loan interest rate contracts as in Teranishi (2007) , which assumes it in the closed economy. 2 In our model, following Gadanecz (2004) , McGuire and Tarashev (2006) , and Milesi-Ferretti (2007, 2008) , banks make loans to both domestic and foreign …rms.
The loan rate stickiness stems from imperfect (monopolistic) competition among banks for …rms as shown in Sander and Kleimeier (2004) , Gropp, Sorensen, and Lichtenberger (2007) , and Gropp and Kashyap (2009) 
We …rst estimate the loan interest rate stickiness for the United Kingdom (UK), the euro area, and Japan. Results show that banks, on average, take three quarters to adjust loan rates in these countries. Then we show that our model with such an estimated loan interest rate stickiness can replicate persistent, volatile, and realistic hump-shaped responses of real exchange rates even with both supply-side disturbances through costpush and loan rate shocks and demand-side disturbances through a monetary policy shock.
In particular, the fact that we can reproduce such a realistic response via a monetary policy shock merits attention. Previous studies, such as Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) and Steinsson (2007) , demonstrate that it is impossible to produce hump-shaped real exchange rate dynamics with such a shock. These results of hump-shaped real exchange rate dynamics are obtained in our model with sticky prices solely due to staggered loan contracts. Interestingly, by further incorporating the staggered price setting, which has been considered the important element for realistic real exchange rate dynamics in former studies, we cannot replicate the hump-shaped real exchange rate dynamics to the monetary policy shock. This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we show the outline of the model. In Section 3, after a brief survey of previous studies related to sticky loan rates, we estimate the degree of loan rate stickiness for the euro area, the UK, and Japan. Section 2 Graham and Wright (2007) also incorporate sticky loan interest rates into a closed-economy general equilibrium model. Contrary to Teranishi (2007) , stickiness in interest rates is imposed for consumers rather than …rms in Graham and Wright (2007) . Thus, the loan interest rate in the IS curve is sticky in Graham and Wright (2007) , but the loan interest rate in the Phillips curve is sticky in our model. 4 shows that realistic responses of real exchange rates are produced in our model with staggered loan contracts. In Section 5, we discuss the case with the staggered price setting.
Finally, Section 6 summarizes the …ndings in this paper.
Model
The model consists of two symmetric countries. There are four types of agents in each country, consumers, …rms, private banks, and the central bank as shown in 
Consumers
A representative consumer chooses the amount of aggregate consumption, bank deposits, and investment in a set of risky assets given a deposit interest rate set by the central bank;
consumes di¤erentiated goods on both home-and foreign-produced consumer goods; provides di¤erentiated labor services to both domestically …nancially supported (DFS) and internationally …nancially supported (IFS) projects, as well as o¤ers wages to those di¤er-entiated types of labor with monopolistic power over labor supply; and owns banks and …rms and receives dividends in each period. 3 In particular, the existence of the di¤erenti-ated labor services is crucial for monopolistic competition in loan rate settings. 4 Thanks to this di¤erentiated labor supply, the demand for loans is di¤erentiated without assuming any restrictions on aggregate loans or loan interest rates.
3 Throughout our analyses, homotheticity of preferences is maintained. 4 We assume that a representative household supplies di¤erentiated labor to each di¤erentiated project.
On the other hand, each household supplies di¤erentiated labor to one project (…rm) in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) , but risks from labor supply di¤erentiation can be completely insured. Both speci…cations produce identical results.
A representative consumer in the home country H maximizes the following welfare W t :
where E t is the expectation operator conditional on the state of nature at date t. U ( ) is an increasing and concave function in the consumption index C t , and V ( ) is an increasing and convex function in labor supply l t ( ). The budget constraint of the consumer is given by
where P t is a price index, B t is a set of risky assets, D t is the amount of deposits at private banks, i t is the nominal deposit interest rate set by a central bank from t 1 to t, w t (h) is the nominal wage for labor supplied from the DFS group l t (h), w t ( h) is the nominal wage for labor supplied from the IFS group l t ( h),
stemming from the ownership of both local and international banks in the home country,
df is the nominal dividend from the ownership of the …rms in the domestic country, and X t;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor. The labor type h and the …rm's project type h match each other. Here, because we assume a complete …nancial market between the two countries, the consumer in each country can internationally buy and sell the state contingent securities to insure against country speci…c shocks. The consumption index that consists of bundles of di¤erentiated goods produced by home and foreign …rms is expressed
where H (0 H 1) is a preference parameter that expresses the home bias. Here, C H;t and C F;t are consumption subindices of the continuum of di¤erentiated goods produced by …rms in the home country and the foreign country, respectively. They are de…ned as
where c t (f ) is the demand for a good produced by …rm f in the home country and c t (f )
is the demand for a good produced by a …rm f in the foreign country, where the asterisk denotes foreign variables. The consumer decides goods demand according to goods prices through a cost minimization under these indices. It is assumed that there is no trade friction and consumers in both countries have the same preferences over the di¤erentiated goods.
The foreign consumers also solve a similar optimization problem.
Firms
There exists a continuum of …rms in each country. Each …rm decides the amount of di¤erentiated labor to be employed from both the DFS and IFS groups through the cost minimization for the production cost. Part of the costs of labor must be …nanced by external loans from banks. For example, in country H, to …nance the costs of hiring workers from the DFS group for the DFS project, the …rm must borrow from local banks in the home country. However, to …nance the costs of hiring workers from the IFS group, the …rm must borrow from international banks in the foreign country. This re ‡ects the fact that …nancial markets are globally integrated, namely, a signi…cant increase has taken place in international borrowing and lending as shown in Gadanecz (2004) , McGuire and Tarashev (2006) , and Milesi-Ferretti (2007, 2008) . We also know by looking into actual project …nance that …rms borrow funds with many di¤erent loan interest rates at the same time, depending on the nature of the projects. Firms tend to face di¤erent loan rates depending on when, why, for what, how long, or how much they require external funds. We interpret that these project di¤erences are characterized by types of labor. For this point, we can assume a situation where each project factory in one region is forced to borrow from a neighbor bank by information or geographical segmentation in the bank evaluating the project, as in Mandelman (2006). 5 Labor is immobile between the two countries. Here, we
5 Kobayashi (2008) shows that a one-to-one relation between a …rm and a bank due to monopoly induces the same loan rate curve as in our model. assume that …rms must use all types of labors and therefore borrow from both local and international banks in the same proportion.
At the same time, each …rm sets goods prices under monopolistically competitive markets under pricing-to-market. In the benchmark model explained here, we do not incorporate the staggered price setting, but prices are sticky due to staggered loan contracts that make marginal costs sticky, similar to the case with the sticky wages. We also examine the case with sticky prices later.
Let us …rst explain the determination of the marginal costs. Firms in both home and foreign countries optimally hire di¤erentiated labor as price takers. This optimal labor allocation is carried out through two-step cost minimization problems. For example, domestic …rm f hires all types of labor from both the DFS and IFS groups. When hiring from the DFS group, the portion of the labor cost associated with labor type h is …nanced by borrowing from the local bank h. Then, the …rst-step cost minimization problem on the allocation of di¤erentiated labor from the DFS group is given by
subject to the subindex regarding labor from the DFS group to …rm f :
where r t (h) is the loan interest rate applied to employ a particular labor type h applied to di¤erentiated labor supply. There l t (h; f ) denotes the type of labor h employed by …rm f . The local bank h has some monopoly power over setting loan interest rates. Thus, we assume monopolistic competition on the loan contracts between banks and …rms. Based on the optimality conditions obtained from the above problem, the …rms optimally choose the allocation of di¤erentiated workers between the two groups. Because …rms have some preference n to hire workers from the DFS group and (1 n) to hire workers from the IFS group, the second-step cost minimization problem describing the allocation of di¤erentiated labor between these two groups is given by
where we de…ne
and t and L t (f ) are those for the IFS group, subject to the aggregate labor index:
Then, we have pro…t maximization in terms of price setting. Each domestic …rm f sets its price p t (f ) and p t (f ) to maximize the pro…t, which is given by
where we de…ne~ t n t 1 n t ; S t is the nominal exchange rate, and c t (f ) and c t (f ) are demand for the goods in domestic and foreign countries, respectively, that can be derived from the consumption bundles de…ned above. Although the …rm sets p t (f ) and p t (f ) separately under the pricing-tomarket assumption, without infrequent price changes we have
We have a similar maximization problem for the foreign …rm f .
Private Banks
There exists a continuum of private banks. There are two types of banks in each country:
local banks and international banks. Each private bank plays two roles. A bank collects the deposits from consumers in its country. It also sets di¤erentiated nominal loan interest rates according to their individual loan demand curves under the monopolistically competitive loan market. This heterogeneity re ‡ects the empirical evidence for dispersed loan rates through the imperfect competition between …rms and private banks on loan contracts reported by Sander and Kleimeier (2004) , Gropp, Sorensen, and Lichtenberger (2007) , and Gropp and Kashyap (2009) . Moreover, Sander and Kleimeier (2004) and Gropp, Sorensen, and Lichtenberger (2007) show that this imperfection induces staggered loan rate contracts, which gives a justi…cation for staggered loan rates found in the empirical studies.
A local bank lends only to …rms when they hire labor from the DFS group. However, an international bank only provides a loan to …rms when they hire labor from the IFS group. We here describe the optimization problem of an international bank in the home country. The international bank takes on the exchange rate risk inherent in its loans.
Each international bank can reset loan interest rates with probability (1 ' ) following the Calvo (1983 )-Yun (1996 framework. Under the segmented environment, private banks can set di¤erent loan interest rates depending on the types of labor. As a consequence, the private bank holds some monopoly power over the loan interest rate to …rms. Therefore, the international bank h chooses the loan interest rate r t h to maximize the present discounted value of pro…t:
where q t;T h ; f is the amounts of loans borrowed by …rm f for the labor types h . The demand for loans is derived from the cost minimization problem by …rms.
Local banks in the home country and international and local banks in the foreign country face a similar pro…t maximization problem.
Linearized Equilibrium Conditions
By log-linearly approximating the equilibrium conditions obtained from above problems around the steady states, we can derive linearized equilibrium conditions. Here,Â t log At A At A A , where A is the steady state of A t : They are as follows. Aggregate consumption in each country is given bŷ
t ( t ) denotes home (foreign) consumer price index (CPI) in ‡ation, u t is a demand shock in the home country, and and are positive parameters regarding the elasticity of consumption with respect to the real interest rate.
The price setting equations in the home and foreign countries are given by
and
where we de…neĈ
Equations (3) to (4) simply show that marginal costs are always constant. An international perfect risk-sharing condition implies
and the de…nitions of nominal and real exchange rates imply
HereR H;t (R F;t ) denotes the loan rate o¤ered by a home local (foreign international) bank to a home …rm,R H;t (R F;t ) denotes the loan rate o¤ered by a home international (foreign local) bank to a foreign …rm, Ŝ t denotes the growth rate of nominal exchange rates,ê t denotes the real exchange rate, m t denotes the cost-push shock in the home country, and
x t denotes the UIP shock. For the reason and importance of the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) shock in open economy models, we can see Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) . 1 , 2 , 1 , and 2 are positive parameters regarding the cost channel of loan contract, and
As shown in Steinsson (2007) , the cost-push shock plays an important role in economic dynamics.
6 When there is no loan contract with ‡exible price, the price setting equations given by equations (3) and (4) are reduced to
The (new Keynesian) loan supply curves in both countries arê
R H;t = 1 E tRH;t+1 + 2RH;t 1 + 3{t + z t ; (10)
andR
Here z t is the loan rate shock for the loan rate set by the home local banks for home …rms. 7 j , j , j , and j for j = 1, 2, and 3 are positive parameters regarding loan rate curves.
In Cúrdia and Woodford (2009) and Gerali et al. (2009) , the loan rate shock comes from a default risk and a risk premium for the borrower. 8 It is worth mentioning that one reason why these loan rate curves include lags because the loan rate is like a price level in the new Keynesian Phillips curve. If the new Keynesian Phillips curve is expressed in terms of the price level rather than in ‡ation, it must contain the lagged price level.
To close the model, the central banks in both countries set the deposit (policy) interest rates following the Taylor (1993)-type rules aŝ
and{
Here v t is a monetary policy shock in the home country. 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 , i , and i are positive policy parameters. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) show the reason and importance of the monetary policy shock.
Note that the policy rate cannot a¤ect consumption since home and foreign consumption is determined by these two equations and equation (8) as implied by Woodford (2003) .
7 When we assume an international loan rate shock for the loan rate set by foreign international banks for home …rms in equation (9), similar results are obtained in simulations.
We have 14 equations, namely, equations (1) to (14), for 14 endogenous variables:Ĉ,
Empirical Evidence for a Sticky Loan Rate
Stickiness in loan rates has been reported regardless of newly contracted or outstanding and short-or long-term contracts. For the US, using micro-data, Slovin and Sushka (1983) show that it takes two or more quarters for private banks to adjust loan rates even for newly contracted loans against changes in the market rate. This …nding is consistent with the results in Berger and Udell (1992) . For the euro area countries, Sorensen and Werner (2006) estimate the incompleteness in the pass-through from policy rates to loan rates via an error correction model using macro-data. They …nd the lags ranging between one and three quarters even for newly contracted long-term loans. Gambacorta (2008) (2006), Sander and Kleimeier (2004) , and Gropp, Sorensen, and Lichtenberger (2007) claim that the lower degree of competition can induce a higher degree of loan rate stickiness. Less competition gives banks the ability to bene…t through sluggish adjustment of the lending rate. On the other hand, Berger and Udell (1992) emphasize relationship banking, insisting that long-run (repeated) business relations between banks and …rms can result in loan rate stickiness. The banks set lower interest rates to insure that risk-averse borrowers in a long-run relationship avoid bankruptcy when interest rates are high. In this paper, we take the former view when modeling the loan rate stickiness.
To understand the real exchange rate dynamics in our model, we need to obtain the parameters on the loan rate stickiness. We estimate the Calvo parameter implicit in the new Keynesian loan rate curve in equation (10) on a quarterly basis is very close to 0.66, the loan interest rates are adjusted by about three quarters in each country. These …ndings are consistent with the former empirical studies.
In the next section, we examine the responses of the real exchange rate to structural shocks under the estimated parameters of sticky loan rates in this section.
Simulation
The parameters are calibrated as in Table 2 . , , , , , , H , 1 , 1 , 2 , 2 , i and i are from Steinsson (2007) , and are from Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) , and ', ' , ', and ' are the estimated average value of loan rate stickiness across the countries in Table 1 . We assume that the ratio of the dependency on external …nance is unity and preferences regarding labor supply are the same between the DFS and IFS groups.
We examine four types of positive 1 percent shocks. They are cost-push shock, loan rates shock, UIP shock, and monetary policy shock. Following Steinsson (2007), we set that each shock follows AR(1) process with a parameter of 0.9. Table 3 shows the detailed simulation outcomes of the real exchange rate dynamics for the home shocks. We report …ve statistics de…ning the real exchange rate dynamics:
(1) UL (up-life); (2) UL/HL (up-life over half-life); (3) QL-HL (quarter-life minus halflife); (4) AR (1) 
The results are shown in Table 3 . 11 The …rst row in the table reports the average of key empirical features of real exchange rates for the UK, the euro area, and Japan shown in Steinsson (2007) . The second to …fth rows illustrate outcomes from the model simulation when loan rates are ‡exible. These results demonstrate that the model can replicate neither hump-shaped dynamics of the real exchange rate nor AR(1) persistence when both the loan rate and price are ‡exible. On the other hand, the sixth to ninth rows show outcomes when banks cannot change loan interest rates every period. We can see that the hump-shaped dynamics of the real exchange rates can materialize for loan rate and monetary policy shocks. In particular, it is worth mentioning that we can reproduce hump-shaped and persistent responses to monetary policy shock, given the fact that it has been considered very di¢ cult (see, for example, Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) and
Steinsson (2007)). Other statistics, namely, AR(1) persistence and the relative standard deviation of real exchange rates compared to that of consumption, are also in line with the empirical values with these two shocks.
The reason for the hump-shaped dynamics re ‡ects the fact that the real exchange rate dynamics depend crucially on the marginal costs. To see this, we transform equations (3) and (4) as
where we use equation (8) and = from the assumption of symmetry. This equation simply implies that the real exchange rate dynamics depend on the loan rate dynamics. When loan rates are sticky, the loan rate dynamics are hump-shaped thanks to the lags of loan rates in equations (9)- (12) to loan rate shocks. This directly results in the hump-shaped real exchange rate dynamics. The monetary policy shock also produces such dynamics since the policy rate works as a shock in the loan rate curves. Moreover, the lag in the monetary policy rule further enhances the hump-shapedness of the loan rate dynamics. 12 Note that the parameters on the …rst and the second terms on the right-hand side of equation (15) imply the role of the home bias. When there is no home bias, namely, H = F , hump-shaped responses of real exchange rates cannot be created.
We observe that the hump-shaped responses do not appear for the cost-push shock.
This will also become clear from equation (15). The cost-push shock directly a¤ects the real exchange rate and does not work through the loan rate adjustments. For the UIP shock, loan rates applied to the home country move exactly in a manner opposite to those of the foreign country. Therefore, the UIP shock can be considered as the same scale but the di¤erent sign of monetary policy shocks to home and foreign countries, respectively.
As a result, we have
Thus, the real exchange rate dynamics are directly determined by the UIP shock following the AR(1) process.
A Case with Infrequent Price Setting
How can the results obtained in the previous section be altered by the introduction of the staggered price setting in addition to the staggered loan contracts examined before?
Following the Calvo (1983 )-Yun (1996 framework, …rms can reset a goods price with some positive probability every period. A detailed derivation is in Appendix A. Note that the model without the staggered price setting can produce in ‡ation persistence thanks to persistent marginal cost. Thus, the model with staggered price setting holds the dual sticky mechanism for the price dynamics.
Two price setting equations given by equations (3) and (4) 
The parameters , , &, , , and & are given in Table 2 . We set that …rms can change the price once a year on average. When there is no loan contract, these augmented new Keynesian Phillips curves are reduced to standard international new Keynesian Phillips curves as in Steinsson (2007). Table 4 shows the simulation outcomes from the model with both sticky price and loan. 13 The second to the …fth rows illustrate outcomes from the model when loan rates are ‡exible. On the other hand, the sixth to ninth rows show outcomes when both …rms and banks cannot change goods prices and loan interest rates every period, respectively.
We can see that the real exchange rate dynamics are hump-shaped only with cost-push and loan rates shocks irrespective of whether the loan rates are sticky or not. The reason for this is exactly that given by Steinsson (2007) . By setting the home bias parameter very high, the home cost-push shock has only negligible e¤ects on foreign variables. Under such circumstances, the hump-shaped responses of real exchange rates come from the responses in home consumption as implied by equation (8). Therefore, eventually, it depends on the dynamics of real interest rates in the home country since the consumption can be represented as the discounted sum of future real interest rates according to the Euler conditions given by equation (1). Here, after a cost-push shock hits the economy, in ‡ation and consumption can move in opposite directions while they co-move to the demand and monetary policy shocks. As a result, real interest rates a¤ected naturally by short-term nominal interest rates set through the Taylor (1993)-type rule show non-monotonic responses. 14 Therefore,
we can reproduce the hump-shaped responses in real interest rates and therefore in real exchange rates to cost-push shocks. A loan rate shock itself is not a cost-push shock, but is considered to be a more microfounded cost-push shock. Thus, a direct shock to loan interest rates works as if it were a cost-push shock and therefore results in hump-shaped responses in the real exchange rate.
At the same time, due to this very reason, a model with the infrequent price change cannot produce the hump-shaped real exchange rate dynamics for monetary policy shock.
The e¤ects of the monetary policy shock through real interest rates completely dominate those observed under the ‡exible price setting. By the same reason in the previous section, the real exchange rate dynamics are solely determined by the UIP shock that follows the AR(1) process. 
Concluding Remarks
, where i is the steady state value of the policy rate as = (1 + i)
in the steady state. We have similar de…nitions for j , j , and j for j = 1, 2, and 3. We have 
Appendix

A Derivation of the model
The model consists of two symmetric countries.
A.1 Consumer
A.1.1 Cost minimization
The utility of the representative consumer 15 in the home country H is increasing and concave in the aggregate consumption index C t . The consumption index that consists of bundles of di¤erentiated goods produced by home and foreign …rms is expressed as:
where H (0 H 1) is a preference parameter that expresses the home bias. Here, C H;t and C F;t are consumption subindices of the continuum of di¤erentiated goods produced by …rms in the home country and the foreign country, respectively. They are de…ned as:
is the demand for a good produced by a …rm f in the foreign country, where the asterisk denotes foreign variables. It is assumed that there are no trade frictions and consumers in both countries have the same preferences over the di¤erentiated goods. Following the standard cost minimization problem on the aggregate consumption index of home and foreign goods as well as the consumption subindices of the continuum of di¤erentiated goods, we can derive the consumption-based price indices: ; where p t (f ) is the price on c t (f ), and p t (f ) is the price on c t (f ). Then, we can obtain the following Hicksian demand functions for each di¤erentiated good given the aggregate consumption:
Here, as in other applications of the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) 16 aggregator, consumers' allocations across di¤erentiated goods at each time are optimal in terms of cost minimization.
We can derive similar optimality conditions for the foreign counterpart. For example, the consumption-based price index is now expressed as:
and the demand functions for each di¤erentiated good given the aggregate consumption are:
A.1.2 Utility maximization
A representative consumer in the home country maximizes the following welfare W t :
where E t is the expectation operator conditional on the state of nature at date t. The budget constraint of the consumer is given by: 17
where B t is a set of risky assets, D t is the deposit to private banks, i t is the nominal deposit interest rate set by a central bank from t 1 to t, w t (h) is the nominal wage for labor supplied from the DFS l t (h), w t ( h) is the nominal wage for labor supplied from is the stochastic discount factor. Here, because we assume a complete …nancial market between the two countries, the consumer in each country can internationally buy and sell the state contingent securities to insure against country speci…c shocks. Consequently, there only exists a unique discount factor. The relationship between the deposit interest rate and the stochastic discount factor is now expressed as:
Given the optimal allocation of di¤erentiated consumption expenditures, the consumer now optimally chooses the total amount of consumption, risky assets, and deposits in each period. Necessary and su¢ cient conditions, when the transversality condition is satis…ed, for those optimizations are given by:
Together with equation (21), we see that the condition given by equation (22) de…nes the intertemporally optimal allocation on aggregate consumption. Then, the standard New Keynesian IS curve for the home country, by log-linearizing equation (22) around steady states, is obtained as follows:
where each variable is de…ned as the log deviation from its steady state where price is ‡exible and loan rate is constant. We de…ne{ t ln(1 + i t )=(1 + i) where i is a steadystate value of i t , t ln
which is an aggregate in ‡ation in the home country, and
In this model, a representative consumer provides all types of di¤erentiated labor to each …rm, and therefore maintains some monopoly power over the determination of his own wage, as in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) . There are two types of labor group: the DFS and the IFS. The workers populated on [0; n) belong to the DFS and other labor populated on [n; 1] belong to the IFS. 18 We assume that each …rm hires all types of labor in the same proportion from the two groups. The consumer sets each wage w t (h) for any h and w t ( h) for any h to maximize its utility subject to the budget constraint given by equation (20) and the labor demand functions given by equations (31) and (32) in the next section. Here, although di¤erentiated labor supply is assumed in this paper, consumers change wages in a ‡exible manner. Then we have the optimality conditions for labor supply as follows:
As written above, thanks to this heterogeneity in labor supply, we can model the di¤er-entiated demand for loans without assuming any restrictions on aggregate loans and loan interest rates. In this paper, consumers supply their labor only for …rms, not for banks.
Similar to the above case with cost minimization, we can derive the optimality conditions for the foreign counterpart. For example, the standard New Keynesian IS curve for the foreign country is:
which is derived from the optimality condition on the foreign asset holdings:
Furthermore, the optimality conditions for labor supply are expressed now as:
A.2 Firms
A.2.1 Cost minimization
Firms in both home and foreign countries optimally hire di¤erentiated labor as price takers.
This optimal labor allocation is carried out through two-step cost minimization problems.
Domestic …rm f hires all types of labor from both the DFS and IFS groups. When hiring from the DFS group, portion of the labor cost associated with labor type h is …nanced by borrowing from the local bank h. Then, the …rst-step cost minimization problem on the allocation of di¤erentiated labor from the DFS is given by
subject to the sub-index regarding labor from DFS to …rm f :
where r t (h) is the loan interest rate applied to employ a particular labor type h applied to di¤erentiated labor supply. There l t (h; f ) denotes type of labor h employed by …rm f . The local bank h has some monopoly power over setting loan interest rates. Thus, we assume the monopolistic competition on the loan contracts between banks and …rms. The relative demand on di¤erentiated labor is given as follows:
where
As a result, we can derive
Through a similar cost minimization problem, we can derive the relative demand for each type of di¤erentiated labor from the IFS as
According to the above two optimality conditions, the …rms optimally choose the allocation of di¤erentiated workers between the two groups. Because …rms have some preference n to hire workers from the DFS and (1 n) to hire workers from the IFS, the second-step cost minimization problem describing the allocation of di¤erentiated labor between these two groups is given by
subject to the aggregate labor index:
Then, the relative demand functions for each di¤erentiated type of labor are derived as follows:
and~ t n t 1 n t : Therefore, we can obtain the following equations:
from equations (27), (28), (29), and (30). We can now clearly see that the demand for each di¤erentiated worker depends on wages and loan interest rates, given the total demand for labor.
Finally, by the assumption that the …rms …nance part of the labor costs by loans, we can derive
q t (h; f ) and q t h; f denote amounts of loan borrowed by …rm f to the labor types h and h, respectively. These conditions demonstrate that the demands for each di¤erentiated loan also depend on the wages and loan interest rates, given the total labor demand.
We can obtain similar conditions for the foreign country. For example
Furthermore, loan demand conditions are
As aggregate labor demand conditions, we can obtaiñ
A.2.2 Price setting (pro…t maximization)
As is standard in the New Keynesian model following the Calvo (1983 ) -Yun (1996 framework, each …rm f resets its price with probability (1 ) and maximizes the present discounted value of pro…t, which is given by
where we use equations (17) and (19) for any time t. Here, the …rm sets p t (f ) and p t (f )
separately under the pricing-to-market assumption. There S t is the nominal exchange rate.
The present discounted value of the pro…t given by equation (33) is further transformed
> :
It should be noted that price setting is independent of the loan interest rate setting of private banks.
The optimal price setting of p t (f ) under the situation in which managers can reset their prices with probability (1 ) is given by
where we substitute equation (23). By further substituting equations (24) and (25) into equation (34), equation (34) can be now rewritten as
By log-linearizing equation (35), we derive 
where mc H;t;T (h; f )
and mc H;t;T h; f
We also de…ne where R H;t is the aggregate loan interest rate by local banks in the home country, R H;t is the aggregate loan interest rate by international banks in the home country, and H;t is in ‡ation of goods produced and consumed in the home country. Then, equation (36) can be transformed into
where we make use of the relationship:
. We de…neR H;t ln(1 + R H;t )=(1 + R H ). We further denote the average real marginal cost as:
The point is that unit marginal cost is the same for all …rms in the situation where each …rm uses all types of labor and loans with the same proportion. Thus, all …rms set the same price if they have a chance to reset their prices at time t.
In the Calvo (1983 ) -Yun (1996 setting, the evolution of the aggregate price index P is described by the following law of motion:
The current aggregate price is given by the weighted average of changed and unchanged prices. Because the chances of resetting prices are randomly assigned to each …rm with equal probability, an aggregate price change at time t should be evaluated by an average of price changes by all …rms. By log-linearizing equation (38), together with equation (37), we can derive the following New Keynesian Phillips curve:
where the slope coe¢ cient
is a positive parameter. This is quite similar to the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve, but contains loan interest rates as cost components.
Similarly, regarding the optimal price setting of p t (f ), we can derive
where c mc H;t is given by replacing P by P in c mc H;t . H;t is in ‡ation of goods produced in the home country and consumed in the foreign country.
Furthermore, from optimal price settings by …rm f in the foreign country, the New Keynesian Phillips curves are derived as
. R F;t is the aggregate loan interest rate by international banks in the foreign country, R F;t is the aggregate loan interest rate by local banks in the foreign country, F;t is in ‡ation of goods produced and consumed in the foreign country, and F;t is in ‡ation of goods produced in the foreign country and consumed in the home country.
As for CPI in ‡ation rates, from equations (16) and (18) (39) and (42) and the weighted average of equations (40) and (41), respectively, we can …nally obtain the following two New Keynesian Phillips curves for consumer prices:
, and
m t and m t are cost-push shocks in home and foreign countries from productivity shocks, respectively. Here, we assume a linear production function as y t (f ) = A tLt (f ), where A t is a common productivity shock among domestic …rms. We have similar production functions for …rms in the foreign country. As shown in Appendix of Steinsson (2007), m t and m t are given by weighted average according to home bias of the home and foreign productivity shocks. In the simulation, we assume productivity shocks in two countries, satisfying m t > 0 and m t = 0 as in Steinsson (2007) .
The de…nition of real exchange rate is given by
When goods price is ‡exible, equations (43) and (44) are reduced to
since …rms change goods prices in each period to maximize a following period pro…t with respect to p t (f ) and p t (f ) as 8 > < > :
where we …nally have b p t (f ) = 0.
When deriving equations (43) and (44), we assume that marginal cost elasticities of productions are zero, namely that the production function is linear, and = and = , as is demonstrated in Table 2 . 19 Furthermore, in this transformation, we use the optimality conditions on bond holdings:
Equation (45) is obtained from two Euler equations in the domestic and foreign countries, namely, equations (23) and (26), under the internationally complete …nancial market. 20 We also use the log deviation of the real exchange rate from its steady state value as t t + 4Ŝ t = 4ê t :
A.3 Private banks
A local bank lends only to …rms when they hire labor from the DFS. However, an international bank only provides a loan to …rms when they hire labor from the IFS.
First, we describe the optimization problem of an international bank in the home country. Here, the international bank takes on the exchange rate risk inherent in its loans.
Each international bank can reset loan interest rates with probability (1 ' ) following the Calvo (1983 ) -Yun (1996 framework. Under the segmented environment stemming from di¤erences in labor supply, private banks can set di¤erent loan interest rates depending on the types of labor. As a consequence, the private bank holds some monopoly power over the loan interest rate to …rms. Therefore, the international bank h chooses the loan interest rate r t h to maximize the present discounted value of pro…t:
The optimal loan condition is now given by
1 9 2 = 0, 1 = 0, 2 = 0, and 1 = 0. If the marginal cost elasticity of production is nonzero, the Phillips curves become more complicated. However, the qualitative outcomes of simulations do not change even under a positive marginal cost elasticity of production.
2 0 Following the convention, we assume e0 = 1.
Because the international private banks that have the opportunity to reset their loan interest rates will set the same loan interest rate, the solution of r t h in equation (46) is expressed only with r t . In this case, we have the following evolution of the aggregate loan interest rate index by international banks in the home country:
By log-linearizing equations (46) and (47), we can determine the relationship between the loan and deposit interest rate as follows:
where 1 Similarly, the optimization problem for a local bank h in the home country is given by
M t is an exogenous disturbance for net interest rate in collecting deposits, where M t is one in the steady state. Cúrdia and Woodford (2009) and Gerali, Neri, Sessa, and Signoretti (2009) emphasize importance of loan rates shock from a default risk and a risk premium for borrower. Through the optimization problem of a local bank h in the home country,
we can obtain the relationship between loan and deposit interest rates as follows:
1+' 2 , and 3
z t is loan rates shock for the loan rate set by the home local bank to a home …rm, which comes from M t . This equation describes the home country's loan interest rate (supply)
curve by the local bank in the home country.
The domestic market loan clearing conditions are expressed as For international banks in the foreign country, we can derive the following loan interest rate curve:R 
B Impulse response
We show the impulse response to a loan rate shock for the loan rate set by the home local bank to a home …rm. Figure A1 shows the case for the model with a ‡exible loan rate and ‡exible goods price settings, and corresponds to the third row of Table 3 . Figure A2 shows the case for the model with a sticky loan rate and ‡exible goods price settings, and corresponds to the seventh row of Table 3 . Figure A3 shows the case for the model with a ‡exible loan rate and sticky goods price settings, and corresponds to the third row of Table 4 . Figure A4 shows the case for a model with a sticky loan rate and sticky goods price settings, and corresponds to the seventh row of Table 4 .
[ Figure A1 : Impulse response to a loan rate shock for the loan rate set by the home local bank for a home …rm in the model with a ‡exible loan rate and ‡exible goods price settings]
[ Figure A2 : Impulse response to a loan rate shock for the loan rate set by the home local bank for a home …rm in the model with a sticky loan rate and ‡exible goods price settings]
[ Figure A3 : Impulse response to a loan rate shock for the loan rate set by the home local bank for a home …rm in the model with a ‡exible loan rate and sticky goods price settings]
[ Figure A4 : Impulse response to a loan rate shock for the loan rate set by the home local bank for a home …rm in the model with a sticky loan rate and sticky goods price settings] loan rate from home local bank to home firm loan rate from home international bank to foreign firm loan rate from foreign local bank to foreign firm loan rate from foreign international bank to home firm home policy rate foreign policy rate Percentage deviation loan rate from home local bank to home firm loan rate from home international bank to foreign firm loan rate from foreign local bank to foreign firm loan rate from foreign international bank to home firm home policy rate foreign policy rate Percentage deviation loan rate from home local bank to home firm loan rate from home international bank to foreign firm loan rate from foreign local bank to foreign firm loan rate from foreign international bank to home firm home policy rate foreign policy rate Percentage deviation loan rate from home local bank to home firm loan rate from home international bank to foreign firm loan rate from foreign local bank to foreign firm loan rate from foreign international bank to home firm home policy rate foreign policy rate
Percentage deviation
